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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, SIXTH AMENDMENT: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
. . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 609: 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from 
him or established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime: 
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which he 
was convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or 
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
iv. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Was Mr. Harper denied effective assistance of counsel 
when his lawyer failed to make certain objections at trial? 
v. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a 
criminal action may take an appeal from a final judgment of 
conviction and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. $78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as 
amended) wherein this Court has appellate jurisdiction over appeals 
from district court criminal cases other than first degree felonies 
or capital convictions. Mr. Harper was convicted of aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony in the ThircP Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, in a bench trial before the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, presiding. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is Mr. Harper's appeal froty his bench trial and 
subsequent conviction on aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
held before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, presiding. 
vi. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TH^ l STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
BOYD D. HARPER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Cise No. 860281-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated 
Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
— • • • • -
Boyd Harper and his wife Linda ^arper had a stormy 
relationship for several years before December 11, 1984, the date of 
the incident in question. Ms. Harper had apparently started divorce 
proceedings three years earlier, but "out bf fear" had reunited with 
Mr. Harper (T. 25). Again in December 1983 she left him for the 
period of a few weeks (T. 16). The precipitating factor in the 
present case seemed to be yet another request by Ms. Harper for a 
divorce on December 11, 1984 (T. 12, 15). 
On the date of the incident, Ms, Harper was home 
babysitting her grandchildren. Mr. Harper was home because of a 
seasonal lay-off (T. 14). Ms. Harper's brother and several other 
visitors were present. At the time of the incident, both Mr. and 
Ms. Harper and their visitors had been drinking (T. 35). 
Apparently, Ms. Harper left the residence and returned at about noon 
with a case of beer (T. 128). About half an hour later, despite her 
indication Mr. Harper was fine when he was sober but becomes a 
"Jekyll and Hyde when he drinks" (T. 17), she brought beer out to 
him and wanted to know if he would join her in drinking (T. 129). 
About four cases of beer were consumed by the Harpers and their six 
visitors during the afternoon (T. 129). She figured she might have 
been drunk at the time of the assault because "we drank all 
afternoon" (T. 35). She also indicated others who were present 
before she and Mr. Harper started arguing were all "fairly drunk." 
(T. 36). After the visitors left, the two argued about divorce and 
related issues (T. 18, 36, 47). Ms. Harper indicated she probably 
provoked Mr. Harper during the argument (T. 20, 37), and may have 
insulted him as well (T. 47). 
Mr. Harper testified he hit Ms. Harper once or maybe 
twice, but he never intended to hit her (T. 131). He wanted to 
leave the residence to let her cool down because he was "about 
three-quarters drunk." Id. Although she called him names, he just 
tried to ignore her and "let her get done babbling." Id. When he 
was walking past her to leave, she made a derogatory remark about 
his little brother (who is retarded) and he, without realizing it, 
just turned around and hit her (T. 132, 153). He testified he gave 
no thought to hitting her before he did it but rather was thinking 
of leaving and letting her cool down. Id. Likewise, he did not 
want to hurt her but only intended to "make her shut her mouth for a 
little while." (T. 134-35, 162). He wanted to wait until the next 
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morning to see if she still wanted the divorce so they could talk it 
over "instead of hollerfing] at each other.11 Id. 
When Ms. Harper was in the bathroom washing blood from 
her face, Mr. Harper left. He testified she was still calling him 
names as he left (T. 134). He figured she only had a bloody nose 
which would stop bleeding in a few minutes, or by the time her 
brother arrived. Mr. Harper did not call for help on the date in 
question because he believed there was no need to. He stated "I 
didn't know she was hurt. Normally a blood[y] nose is not enough to 
call the police over." (T. 148). 
According to Ms. Harper, Mr. Hamper apparently hung up 
the phone as Ms. Harper was talking to her nephew following their 
arguments. Ms. Harper testified Boyd Harper then hit her twice with 
his fists (T. 19, 21, 41). Ms. Harper indicated to her physician 
she may have been kicked in the face, a statement inconsistent with 
her later statements at trial (T. 91). At trial she said she 
remembered being hit with a fist and said nothing about being kicked 
(T. 21). Although she was in the hospital for nine days following 
the incident, the treating physician indicated she was hospitalized 
primarily for neurological observations and to allow for her 
swelling to reduce before undergoing plastic surgery (T. 96, 102-03). 
Mr. Harper also indicated Ms. Harper had a history of 
excessive drinking. He had taken her to the hospital on other 
occasions because she would at times regurgitate blood following her 
consumption of beer, whiskey or wine (T. 135, 147). Lori Mcclusky, 
the victim's daughter testified her mother throws up "a great amount 
of blood" "every day" when she drinks whiskey due to her ulcer 
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(T. 63). On at least one prior occasion Mr. Harper had tried to 
take her to the hospital but she "wouldn't let them work on her." 
(T. 147). 
Dr. Bradd Christensen testified he treated Linda Harper 
on December 11, 1984 after she had been assaulted (T. 89-90). 
Although Ms. Harper testified she did not remember waking up until 
5:00 a.m. the next morning, (T. 21) the doctor indicated she was 
conscious when he first examined her in the emergency room (T. 90). 
Although Ms. Harper was initially uncooperative, she did finally 
allow the physician to examine her (T. 92). 
Physical examination revealed Ms. Harper had a fracture 
of her cheekbone or zygoma (T. 93) as well as a comminuted fracture 
(broken into many pieces) of her nose (T. 92, 93). Ms. Harper 
complained of shoulder pain, but x-rays of the area proved normal. 
Id. The doctor testified Ms. Harper remained neurologically intact 
and "she developed no indications of serious injury to her head or 
spinal cord" (T. 95) . 
The surgeon testified at trial he would like to perform 
additional surgery on Ms. Harper to completely restore her airway on 
the left side of her nose and to correct the depression of her nose 
which she now has (T. 97). The cheekbone or zygoma had healed and 
did not need any corrective surgery. Id. Both the dimpling of her 
cheek and the interference with her facial animation similarly 
corrected spontaneously (T. 100). The doctor testified he thought 
any injury to the face of a woman could be considered serious 
disfigurement (T. 109). The doctor indicated the irregularities he 
observed on Ms. Harper's nose, though obvious to him because of his 
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expertise might not have been apparent to the "man on the street" 
(T. 111). The doctor had never seen either Ms, Harper nor a picture 
of her before he treated her and he therefore could not state with 
accuracy whether her outward appearance had changed (T. 110), The 
doctor could not testify with accuracy as to whether Ms. Harper 
would suffer a "permanent abnormality" until after her next surgery 
(T. 114). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In critical areas, Mr. Harper's defense counsel failed to 
act effectively. This lack of adequate representation denied Mr. 
Harper his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. HARPER WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
In the case at bar, defense counsel failed to make a 
motion in limine to exclude Mr. Harper's prior convictions, and 
additionally failed to object to their admission at trial. During 
cross-examination of Mr. Harper, the prosecutor elicited damaging 
responses which the judge relied upon in his finding Mr. Harper 
guilty. (T. 136-37, Ruling at 7). It is also apparent from the 
prosecutor's questions she was fishing for admissions of convictions 
and in so doing, took advantage of defense counsel's failure to 
object. It is also obvious from the transcript, Mr. Harper had been 
inadequately prepared by his lawyer regarding how he should answer 
such questions. The relevant portion of the testimony follows: 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS, BEARNSON: 
Q. Do you have any prior felony convictions? 
A* Yes. 
Q. What prior felony convictions do you have? 
A. One theft. 
Q. And when was that? 
A. 1980. 
Q. isn't it true that you have two prior felony 
theft convictions? 
A. No. it is not true. 
Q. Were you not convicted of a felony theft in 1979? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. in the Third District Court? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. Have you ever been convicted of a misdemeanor 
involving dishonesty, or false statement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What misdemeanor were you convicted of? 
A. Class A misdemeanor. 
Q. in what year? 
A. '79. 
Q. So a Class A misdemeanor theft in 1979, and a 
second-degree felony theft in 1980? 
A. No. 
Q. Pardon me? 
A. No. 
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Q. Okay. Then what? 
A. A third-degree felony. 
Q. In 1980? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any other convictions for 
misdemeanors involving dishonesty, or false 
statement? 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. involving a lie or deceit? 
A. Not that I know of. 
(T. 136-37). 
In his ruling finding Mr. Harper guilty of aggravated 
assault the judge stated, "I choose not to believe the statements o 
the Defendant . . . for a number of reasons. . . . And I think his 
credibility for truth and veracity is somewhat impaired because of 
his prior criminal record." (Ruling at 7)^ 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2054, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984), th 
Supreme Court announced a two prong test to determine whether 
counsel was functioning in such a fashion as to deprive the accused 
of his sixth amendment right to counsel. The Court stated ff[t]he 
Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel 
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to 
the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results." Id 
at 685. Therefore, the Court reasoned, "the right to counsel is th 
right to effective assistance of counsel." Id. 
The test announced in Strickland requires first that the 
defendant show counsel's performance was deficient. Errors under 
this prong must be "so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Secondly, the defendant must show "the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. 
This Court, in the recent decision of State v. Morehouse, 
73 Utah Adv. Rep. 114 (reh'g denied February 1, 1988) affirmed Mr. 
Morehouse's conviction despite his claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel and in so doing relied on the Strickland v. Washington 
standard, in Morehouse, this Court followed the rationale of State 
v. Archuleta, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1987). The Utah Supreme 
Court in Archuleta indicated it would only consider whether the 
complained of conduct fell below the required standard of objective 
reasonableness if the person asserting the claim could first show 
the conduct prejudiced his case. Id. at 16. Confidence in the 
outcome of the trial must be undermined by the ineffective counsel. 
Id. at 17. 
In Morehouse, defense counsel advised his client not to 
testify based on his "erroneous belief that the rules of evidence 
would allow the defendant to be impeached on cross-examination by 
the introduction of all his previous criminal convictions. . . ." 
Morehouse, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 116, Jackson, J. dissenting. Mr. 
Morehouse's trial attorney later realized he erred by not filing a 
pretrial motion to limit the use of any prior convictions for 
impeachment purposes under the rationale of State v. Banner, 717 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1985). Morehouse, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 117. 
A, THE CONDUCT OF MR. HARPER'S COUNSEL 
PREJUDICED HIS CASE. 
State v. Banner clarified the standard for use of prior 
felony convictions for impeachment purposes. In so doing, it 
abandoned the standard previously followed which had been set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. §78-24-9 (1953 as amended) which required a 
witness to admit to his previous felony convictions. Banner 
analyzed Rule 609(a) Utah R. Evid., effective September 1, 1985, and 
indicated the Rule superseded the statute. Rule 609(a) provides in 
part: 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
from him or established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime: 
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which he 
was convicted, and the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or 
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
In the present case, because there was no pretrial 
motion, there was never a determination of whether the probative 
value of any of Mr. Harper's convictions outweighed its prejudicial 
effect as required by State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334. Because 
the judge found Mr. Harper's credibility for truth and veracity was 
impaired because of his record, there can be no doubt the admissions 
had a prejudicial effect. 
Furthermore, there is likewise no showing that any 
conviction Mr. Harper might have had for theft was necessarily one 
involving dishonesty or false/statement under Rule 609(a)(2). As 
noted by Judge Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Morehouse, 73 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 118-19, n.2, federal courts (which we must look to 
for interpretations of the Rules) are not in agreement on exactly 
what constitutes "dishonesty or false statement" within the Rule. 
The testimony should not have been allowed absent some showing by 
the prosecution Mr. Harper's theft conviction involved deceit or an 
indication bearing on his propensity to testify truthfully. Mr. 
Harper would urge this Court to adopt an interpretation of the Rule 
which would exclude the theft conviction. I_d. citing United States 
v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
Finally, Mr. Harper relies on State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 
768 (Utah 1986) to show he was prejudiced by his trial attorney's 
conduct. In Peterson, the defendant testified he had three prior 
felony convictions all of which were burglaries. However, on 
cross-examination, the prosecutor in Peterson asked, "Are you sure 
they're [sic] only three?" He also asked, "Was there not another 
one in 1978 in Spokane?" Id. at 769. As in the case at bar, the 
prosecutor in Peterson did nothing to verify the alleged convictions 
and did not offer a rap sheet for introduction into evidence. In 
Peterson, the Court found the trial court erred in not granting a 
mistrial on the issue.1 The Court recognized Peterson's concern 
that the prosecutor's inferences would cause the jury to doubt his 
denial of the charge and seriously undermine his credibility. 
1 Although the Court found the error was prejudicial, it nonetheless 
affirmed the conviction because it could not find absent the 
prosecutorial misconduct there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result. 
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In the case at bar, the prosecutor's questions should 
have been objected to unless it was known by counsel the prosecutor 
had some reliable documentation of any of his convictions. Under 
Rule 609, Mr. Harper may not have been required to answer he had any 
convictions. Because the judge relied at least in part on those 
convictions in assessing the evidence, Mr. Harper clearly suffered 
prejudice due to his ineffective counsel. 
B. MR. HARPER'S COUNSEL'S CONDUCT FELL BELOW THE 
REQUIRED STANDARD OF OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS. 
As indicated, trial counsel failed to make a pre-trial 
motion to limine to exclude the admission of Mr. Harper's prior 
convictions. Rule 609 and State v. Banner require defense lawyer to 
make such motions in the interest of adequately representing their 
clients. Additionally, Mr. Harper cites to several other examples 
where his trial lawyer failed to object to damaging evidence. For 
example, the prosecutor laid minimal foundation for the introduction 
of six photographs. All were admitted without objection (T. 80). 
Some appeared to be photographs of virtually the same thing and the 
probative value of some was never questioned in relation to their 
prejudicial effect as should have been done under Rule 403, Utah R. 
Evidence. 
During the medical testimony regarding examination and 
treatment of the victim, defense counsel failed to object to 
non-responsive answers which were prejudicial to Mr. Harper (T. 
80). Under Rule 611, Utah R. Evid., defense counsel should have 
objected to the damaging answer which, under the prosecutor's line 
of questioning probably never would have come in but for counsel's 
deficient performance. 
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Defense counsel also failed to object under Rule 703 to a 
hypothetical question posed to the doctor which included a fact 
which was not within the doctor's knowledge and which had not been 
introduced into evidence.2 (T. 98). 
Additionally, defense counsel asked several questions 
which were either damaging in and of themselves or elicited damaging 
answers, all of which could have been avoided by reasonably 
competent counsel. (T. 103-06, 112-114, 116-19). 
When Mr. Harper was attempting to indicate he could not 
testify regarding the photographs because he was not there when they 
were taken, his lawyer, rather than assist him, allowed the 
prosecutor to badger him into making damaging admissions (T. 151). 
Finally, the court indicated concern regarding the issue 
of provocation in the case before him. To Mr. Harper's detriment, 
his lawyer never addressed the court's concern nor did he seem to 
explore this as a possible defense (T. 194). Clearly, Mr. Harper's 
counsel's performance fell below an acceptable limit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Harper's case was clearly 
prejudiced by the actions and failures of his trial counsel. But 
for his lawyer's conduct which fell below any objective reasonable 
standard, the outcome would probably have been different. Therefore 
2 The doctor's response was based upon indication of a loss of 
consciousness, yet all who saw or heard Ms. Harper indicated there 
was not a loss of consciousness. (T. 53, 56, 68, 76-77, 91, 148, 
157). The memory loss Ms. Harper described (T. 21) is different 
from a loss of consciousness, and does not carry the medical 
significance of a loss of consciousness. 
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his conviction ought to be reversed and his case ought to be 
remanded for a new trial. ^^fi^_ 
DATED this / / day of February, 1988. 
KHRIS HARROLD 
Attorney for Defendant 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH BOWMAN, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and four 
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this f / day of February, 1988. 
, / / ? ^ 
DELIVERED by this day of 
February, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-5-103. Aggravated Assault.—(1) A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in section 
76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the third degree. 
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